Paul J. Stancil

Professor

Professor Paul Stancil joined the Illinois College of Law faculty in fall 2006. Before coming to Illinois, Professor Stancil was a shareholder at Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. (Milwaukee), where his practice focused on antitrust and trade regulation matters. Professor Stancil teaches Antitrust Law, Civil Procedure, Public Choice Theory, and Mergers & Acquisitions.

Professor Stancil has broad research interests in law and economics, antitrust law, civil procedure, and public choice theory. He specializes in analyzing the complex incentives that motivate individuals and groups in both the creation and application of law. Professor Stancil has written on the legitimacy of statutory interpretation by courts and the economic incentives facing parties in civil and criminal litigation; he has also written articles exploring the influence of interest groups in various aspects of the political process. Professor Stancil’s research strives to connect a rich theoretical account of law and lawmaking with the complex and often messy dynamics of the real world. He is particularly interested in the role transaction costs play in motivating real-world individual and group behavior.

Professor Stancil’s articles have appeared in the Virginia Law Review, the William & Mary Law Review, the Cardozo Law Review, and the Baylor Law Review, among others. 

Professor Stancil earned his B.A. in economics and Spanish from the University of Virginia and graduated Order of the Coif from the University of Virginia School of Law.  After law school graduation, Professor Stancil worked for Baker Botts (Houston) and another small Texas firm as an antitrust and litigation associate before leaving to help start an antitrust practice group at Godfrey & Kahn.

For the Media

Professor Stancil is generally available to comment on the following subjects:

  • Antitrust Law & Policy (merger review, high-profile civil and criminal cases, etc.)
  • Civil Procedure (federal)
  • Civil Litigation Dynamics
  • The Role of Interest Groups in the Political Process
  • White Collar Crime